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Abstract  
The ability to verify the integrity of video files is important for consumer and business applications alike. 
Especially if video files are to be used as evidence in court, the ability to prove that a file existed in a 
certain state at a specific time and was not altered since is crucial. This paper proposes the use of  
blockchain technology to secure and verify the integrity of video files. 
To demonstrate a specific use case for this concept, we present an application that converts a video-
camera enabled smartphone into a cost-effective tamperproof dashboard camera (dash cam). If the 
phone’s built-in sensors detect a collision, the application automatically creates a hash of the relevant 
video recording. This video file’s hash is immediately transmitted to the OriginStamp service, which 
includes the hash in a transaction made to the Bitcoin network. Once the Bitcoin network confirms the 
transaction, the video file’s hash is permanently secured in the tamperproof decentralized public ledger 
that is the blockchain. Any subsequent attempt to manipulate the video is futile, because the hash of the 
manipulated footage will not match the hash that was secured in the blockchain. Using this approach, 
the integrity of video evidence cannot be contested. The footage of dashboard cameras could become a 
valid form of evidence in court. 
In the future, the approach could be extended to automatically secure the integrity of digitally recorded 
data in other scenarios, including: surveillance systems, drone footage, body cameras of law enforce-
ment, log data from industrial machines, measurements recorded by lab equipment, and the activities 
of weapon systems. 
We have made the source code of the demonstrated application available under an MIT License and 
encourage anyone to contribute: www.gipp.com/dtt 
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1   Introduction  
The blockchain is a collaboratively maintained and decentralized data structure that has enabled a  
variety of applications. Beyond the realm of cryptocurrencies, the protocol underlying blockchain has  
implications in any domain where a trustless, anonymous, and tamperproof means of recordkeeping is 
required.  
The decentralized and collaboratively maintained ledger technology at the heart of the blockchains of 
cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008), represents a seminal contribution to Information 
Technology. Some have described the blockchain as a ‘disruptive technology’ with the potential to ‘rev-
olutionize the interface between economic agents’ (Pilkington, 2016). Others have compared blockchain 
to the paradigm shift that resulted from the introduction of the PC or the World Wide Web (Swan, 2015). 
Indeed, the unique characteristics of the blockchain, namely its distributed and tamperproof character-
istics, and its public yet anonymous recordkeeping, have enabled the rethinking of applications beyond 
the realm of finance. Some recently introduced applications include: the creation and transaction of 
digital assets2, the design of smart contracts that automatically enforce according to predetermined rules 
(Kosba, Miller, Shi, et al., 2015); and the blockchain application upon which this paper builds, namely 
the trusted timestamping of digital data (Gipp, Meuschke & Gernandt, 2015).  
Trusted timestamping is a procedure for verifying the existence of unaltered digital data at a specific 
point in time (Haber & Stornetta, 1990). In a previous paper, we demonstrated how the blockchain of a 
cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin, can serve as a decentralized trusted timestamping service if the hash 
value of a digital file is embedded into the transaction record of the cryptocurrency (Gipp, Meuschke & 
Gernandt, 2015). In that paper, we introduced OriginStamp (http://www.originstamp.org/), a web  
service implementing decentralized trusted timestamping (DTT) on the Bitcoin blockchain. Of course,  
another blockchain could also be used.  
The service allows the public to create trusted timestamps for digital files free of charge. To keep fees 
to a minimum, OriginStamp aggregates the hashes it receives and then performs a single Bitcoin trans-
action using the smallest transferrable amount (1 Satoshi = 0.00000001 BTC) every 24 hours. With this 
approach, the operating costs of OriginStamp are covered by its developers, given that they amount to 
only around 10 USD per year (Gipp, Meuschke & Gernandt, 2015).  
Even if Bitcoins would become very valuable in the future, the service would not become prohibitively 
expensive. Currently, the service maintenance cost is attributable mainly to the transaction fees levied 
by the Bitcoin network, and not the transacted amount of Bitcoin. 
In this paper, we present the scenario in which DTT is used to automatically secure video file integrity 
for dashboard cameras. The proposed solution enables the cost-effective recording of what we term 
Tamperproof Video Evidence in the Blockchain (TVEB). 
1.1   Scenario  
The use of dashboard cameras to record video evidence is increasing. Today, not only police and high-
way patrol vehicles are routinely equipped with video recording devices, but even consumers are  
purchasing such systems. Dash cams are more widely adopted in countries where reckless driving is a 
problem, where law enforcement is corrupt, or the police is not trusted (Paul and Kitson, 2014).  
However, also in the UK, the number of consumers protecting themselves against insurance fraud by 
purchasing dashboard cameras is on the rise (Gammell, 2015). If a fraudulent individual purposefully 
initiates an accident, a dash cam user can present the video recording to their insurance in an attempt to 
prove that they are not to blame. As Mark Godfrey, director of RAC Insurance, states “Dashcams give 
                                                      
2 http://coloredcoins.org/ 
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drivers an added level of protection to guard against unexpected malicious events which they might 
otherwise struggle to prove.” (Gammell, 2015). 
Additionally, the existence of a video recording can prevent disputes, thus saving time and legal fees. 
Only recently, a German appellate court ruled that the use of video material from dashboard cameras is 
permissible as evidence to prosecute traffic violations (Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, 2016). Given this 
development, it is more crucial than ever to have secure means for proving that the video footage has 
not been manipulated after the accident.  
Currently, there is no simple, cost-effective and automated method available to consumers to prove that 
video footage was not tampered with after a specific point in time. If the authenticity of a video file is 
contested, the status quo requires testimony of witnesses, or the hiring of experts to verify that the digital 
file has retained its integrity. These approaches are costly and time consuming. For example, it took two 
years for an international investigation into Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, which was shot down over the 
Ukraine in 2014, to confirm that several satellite images released by the Russian military had been dig-
itally manipulated (Kramer, 2016). Additionally, there is no guarantee that a carefully and meticulously 
performed fraudulent modification of metadata or video frames will be discovered.  
A secure and cost-effective method is needed to allow anyone to verify that a video file has not been 
tampered with after a claimed date. To address this scenario, we introduce a mobile application that acts 
as a dashboard camera, which automatically creates a tamperproof distributed trusted timestamp on the 
Bitcoin blockchain for video files recorded during a collision. 
2   Background:  Trusted  Timestamping,  and  Characteristics  of  
the  Blockchain  
The concept of attaching a timestamp to physical documents or evidence to certify their integrity at a 
specific time is not new. Historically, public notaries, governments, or other trusted third parties have 
been tasked with verifying the authenticity of files. However, this approach has the shortcoming that 
timestamps are vulnerable to a central vouching party. 
As digitally stored data began playing an increasingly important role in business in the early 1990s, 
‘Trusted Timestamping’ schemes for digital data were proposed (Fischer, 1991; Haber & Stornetta Jr, 
1992). In 2001, the Time-stamp Protocol (TSP), or RFC 3161 standard, was introduced, which relies on 
public key infrastructure to generate trusted timestamps (Adams & Pinkas, 2001). This protocol is still 
being used by today’s Time Stamping Authorities (TSA).  
Improvements to the RFC 3161 standard were made in the 2005 ANSI ASC x9.95 standard for trusted 
timestamps, which defined additional data-level security requirements (American National Standards 
Institute, 2005). However, for both protocols, the specified timestamping process relies on a centralized 
trusted third party (TTP). The TTP acts as the TSA and is tasked with both issuing timestamps and 
verifying timestamp validity. Because the TSA is the central record-keeper, the integrity of timestamps 
is vulnerable to the trustworthiness and the security standards enforced by the TSA. If, for example, the 
private key used by the TSA for the public key encryption scheme is compromised, the validity of 
timestamps is at risk. 
With the introduction of cryptocurrencies, the blockchain for the first time allowed for tamperproof, 
trustless, anonymous, and automatically programmable ‘Decentralized Trusted Timestamping’ (DTT) 
(Gipp, Meuschke & Gernandt, 2015). DTT is the concept of submitting the hash of a digital file to be 
included in a transaction made in a cryptocurrency network, which results in the hash being permanently 
stored in the decentralized and collaboratively maintained blockchain data structure.  
Figure 1 shows the procedure for DTT as implemented in the OriginStamp service, which is described 
in detail in Gipp et al. (2015). As can be seen in the figure, the procedure involves an intermediate step 
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in which the individual file hashes are collected and hashed again. Only this ‘aggregated hash’ is used 
to initiate the Bitcoin address calculation to which the minimum transactional amount of Bitcoin is sent. 
By aggregating the hashes, OriginStamp is able to offer the DTT service free of charge, because the 
transaction fees that are levied by the Bitcoin network for each transaction (currently around 0.0001 
BTC) are kept to a minimum. The downside of this approach is that timestamps are created with a delay, 
of up to 24 hours, depending on when the hash is received. However, for the majority of consumer use-
cases this granularity is sufficient. Additionally, users have the option to pay a small fee on the  
OriginStamp platform to immediately send their hash for DTT in the Bitcoin network. 
 
Figure 1:  Procedure for Decentralized Trusted Timestamping on the Blockchain, source: (Gipp, 
Meuschke & Gernandt, 2015) 
In the following section, we introduce an automated solution that can run on a user’s smartphone to 
secure file integrity and automatically attach a trusted timestamp3 to video files recorded during a  
vehicular accident. 
                                                      
3 For the sake of brevity, the terms ‘timestamping’ or ‘trusted timestamping’ are used interchangeably to refer to the ‘decen-
tralized trusted timestamping procedure relying on the blockchain’ as described in Figure 1. 
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3   System  for  Trusted  Timestamping  of  DashCam  Video  
The Android native application presented in this paper uses the phone’s built-in camera to continuously 
record video in the background while the vehicle is moving. If the phone’s built-in sensors register a 
sudden impact, the relevant video files are extracted and a SHA256 hash is calculated to secure the 
content of the file and prevent future tampering. The mobile application immediately transmits the hash 
to the OriginStamp trusted timestamping service. OriginStamp in turn submits the hash to the Bitcoin 
blockchain for persistent and tamperproof storage by performing a transaction with the minimum  
transactional amount to a Bitcoin address generated from the hash. Storing of the hash in the blockchain 
makes it impossible to tamper with the video file in retrospect without the change being apparent. 
The components of the system can be divided into the two types of functionalities: 
•   Core functionalities – These functionalities are implemented in an Android Service Class that is 
capable of running in the background even when the user switches between applications. 
•   Non-core functionalities – These functionalities must not always be running. The only non-core  
functionalities are Hash Submission Notification, and the implementation of Viewing and Verifying 
Collision Videos. 
Since collisions cannot be anticipated, all core modules of the system must continuously run in the 
background. The application’s core functionalities are:  
1.   continuously record video 
2.   detect a collision incident using the phone’s accelerometer 
3.   identify and merge video files relevant for the “collision incident” 
4.   generate a hash (SHA256) of the prepared video files 
5.   transmit the hash for trusted timestamping in the blockchain 
6.   notify the user-specified contacts 
Figure 2 gives an overview of the system’s actions in the case of a collision. 
 
Figure 2.  Sequence of application actions upon collision detection 
To record the critical time of a collision without quickly using up device storage, the application  
continuously records sections of video that are temporarily stored and then overwritten. If an impact is 
registered, the application combines the recording at the time of impact with the temporarily stored older 
recording, and with the recording from immediately after the collision. Since only the video footage 
from around the time of the collision must be stored, the default video quality is set to maximum.  
Even if the user navigates to another application on the phone, the dash cam application continues to 
record video in the background. The video being recorded is shown to users as an unobtrusive 50x50 
pixel box in the top right corner of the screen, refer to Figure 5, b). This allows users to make regular 
use of their smartphone, while reminding them that video is being recorded in the background. To 
achieve this feature, the application creates a new Surface View to which an instance of Android’s  
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MediaRecorder Class is attached. This Surface View is created in the Service Class, which runs in the 
background and thus ensures that the view is not destroyed when the user switches between applications. 
3.1   Collision  detection  
The built-in accelerometer of the user’s smartphone is used to detect the impact of a collision.  
Acceleration values are queried every 100 milliseconds and checked for all three axes: x, y, and z.  
A sudden change, as determined by the magnitude of the difference in the recorded values is used to 
signal the occurrence of a collision. The application uses the SensorEventListener to access the accel-
erometer data. Upon detecting a significant change in the sensor values, the Listener calls the  
onSensorChanged method. Additionally, a check for GPS movement is performed. If significant move-
ment continues after the collision, then no collision is declared. 
3.2   Extracting  and  securing  video  
To prevent the application from using up unnecessary memory on the user’s phone, video recording 
occurs in continuous chunks of 10-second intervals. Figure 3 shows how this approach is used to free 
up device memory and allow for continuous recording in the background.  
If no collision is detected within the “current” time window, then the “previous” recording is discarded, 
the “current” time frame is saved as the new “previous” timeframe, and a new “current” recording win-
dow is started. Using this approach, no more than two video chunks are stored in memory at any given 
time. This process continues until the user exits the application or a collision is detected. 
 
Figure 3.  Video recording procedure 
If a collision is detected in the current time window, the application records an additional chunk of 
video. Given this approach, in the case of a collision, the video recording consists of three 10 second 
chunks, resulting in a video clip of 30 seconds. This relatively short recording length was implemented 
to free up static memory on the device and allow users to make regular use of their phone while recording 
video in the background. Of course, the recording length can be customized in the future. 
In addition to automatic collision detection, the user can press a button within the application to prompt 
the immediate saving and timestamping of video at any time. This allows capturing events related to 
crime, traffic, wildlife, extreme weather, etc. 
Once the video files have been recorded and ordered, a hash is computed of the resulting video file. The 
variable finalByte contains the data of the ordered video files in byte form. The byte form of the video 
data is hashed using SHA-256. This hashing algorithm was chosen because it is considered secure 
against collision attacks (Gilbert & Handschuh, 2003). The resulting hash is also stored to the user’s 
smartphone for future reference and file verification. 
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3.3   Transmitting  hash  for  trusted  timestamping  
For the hash of the video file to be associated with a tamperproof decentralized trusted timestamp in the 
Bitcoin blockchain, the hash is transmitted to the OriginStamp service. A POST request to  
OriginStamp’s REST API is made in the sendHashServer method. The API of OriginStamp can be used 
free of charge with no rate limit4.  
Once the hash has been transmitted, the user is shown a confirmation on their mobile device. Addition-
ally, the application notifies the user’s emergency contacts, which the user can specify within the appli-
cation. A simple SMS sending mechanism is used to notify the contacts of the collision location. In the 
future, the system could be expanded to automatically notify the region’s emergency medical services. 
3.4   System  frontend  
Figure 4 shows several screens of the user interface of the application. Image a) shows the start-up 
screen where the user is prompted to begin video camera recording. Once the recording is initiated, the 
application displays the user’s location on a Google map and an unobstructive square of the real-time 
recording in the upper right corner of the phone at all times, image b). Upon the detection of sudden 
impact, the application registers a collision incident, prepares the required video files to be persistently 
stored and the screen flashes a confirmation of hash submission to the user, image c). In image d), the 
user can browse video recordings of accident incidents, and can view the hash digest stored in a .txt file. 
 
   
a) b) c) d) 
Figure 4.  Application interface 
3.5   Proving  video  file  integrity  
To prove that the video file has not been modified since the hash was embedded in the blockchain, the 
user can now provide the original video files as stored on their smartphone together with the file hash 
to the relevant authorities. The lawyer, claims agent, or anyone wanting to verify the file’s authenticity 
can compare the presented video file’s hash with the hash stored in the Bitcoin blockchain. Verifying 
the existence of the file hash (i.e. the Bitcoin address generated from the hash) can be performed using 
the OriginStamp website, or using any Bitcoin blockchain inspection tool, such as  
blockexplorer.com, or blockchain.info. 
                                                      
4 http://www.originstamp.org/developer 
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Since the mobile application automatically performs DTT in the background with no user involvement, 
the user has no time to tamper with the video files. If the user were to tamper with the video files in 
retrospect, the resulting hash will be different than the hash submitted to the Bitcoin blockchain, which 
will disavow their claim to file integrity and time of file existence.  
Given the recent ruling of a German appellate court to accept video evidence for prosecuting traffic 
violations (Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, 2016), it is only a matter of time before courts must also con-
sider secure methods for proving the validity of video files captured by dashboard cameras. As observed 
by D. Cawrey, “courts around the world will eventually need [to] become familiar with the use of  
cryptographic hashes as a form of verification” (Cawrey, 2014). Currently, precedence has yet to be 
established regarding the obligation of courts to recognize trusted timestamping using the blockchain of 
a cryptocurrency as evidence in court proceedings.  
3.6   Limitations  
The current application submits the hash of the video file to Bitcoin’s blockchain with an involuntary 
delay due to the approach of the OriginStamp service aggregating all hashes received over a 24-hour 
period and only submitting a master hash to the blockchain to save transaction fees and offer the service 
free of charge. In the future, the granularity of timestamps can be improved by giving users the option 
to submit each hash individually without delay. Currently, OriginStamp additionally publishes each  
received hash immediately to Twitter to mitigate this limitation (https://twitter.com/originstamp). 
Future implementations to automatically secure video integrity using blockchain technology could ex-
plore the use of non-Bitcoin coupled blockchains. A benefit of using, for example, Ethereum5, or a data 
layer built on top of Bitcoin’s blockchain, such as Factom6, is that the application remains uninfluenced 
by potential future Bitcoin transaction fee increases. Currently, the maintenance costs of the service are 
almost exclusively attributable to the transaction fees levied on transaction in the Bitcoin network, since 
these fees are required as an incentive for Bitcoin miners to integrate transactions into new blocks. A 
second benefit would be that Bitcoin’s blockchain is not unnecessarily bloated with non-Bitcoin related 
transactions. However, a major drawback of using a non-Bitcoin blockchain is that the service no longer 
benefits from the trustworthiness that comes with its widespread use and a market capitalization of ap-
proximately 10 billion USD. Currently, one can assume that as long as Bitcoins hold any value, the 
Bitcoin blockchain cannot be manipulated. 
4   Future  Work  
4.1   Web  Portal  for  Emergency  Services  
In the future, the proposed system’s mobile frontend will be extended with a web portal component to 
allow app users to better manage and download their video files, or enable friends or emergency services 
to check up on the users of the app. 
Such a web portal would be supplementary to the presented mobile application and could allow users to 
enter medical data to be used by emergency services. Emergency medical services could have an access 
point to this portal that allows them to see the location of a collision, the emergency contacts, and the 
user-specified medical data, such as blood type, allergies to medication, etc. The web portal will update 
in real-time with the data and video files recorded during collision incidents in the mobile application.  
                                                      
5 https://www.ethereum.org/ 
6 http://factom.org/ 
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4.2   Outlook  
In the future, the concept of automatically securing video footage with decentralized trusted timestamps 
in the Blockchain could be applied to other domains. Beyond the specific example of a dashboard  
camera application – as presented in this paper – other areas of use that could benefit from securing 
Tamperproof Video Evidence in the Blockchain (TVEB) include:  
•   public and private video surveillance systems for security, or theft prevention.  
•   video conferencing systems, where the automatic timestamping of important meetings, or con-
tract agreements could protect individuals or firms, for example, when discussing ideas that may 
be patented.  
•   the movie and creative industry, where the trusted timestamping of video footage at the time of 
production could be used to prove priority or copyright claims. 
•   aerial footage from civil and military aircraft or drones. For example, the video footage of a 
drone documenting the current state of buildings and infrastructure, or of a nature reserve, could 
be automatically associated with a decentralized trusted timestamp to prevent governments or 
special interest groups from disputing the observations. 
•   body cameras worn by police and law enforcement officers that implement automatic DTT of 
video files to prove video file integrity. 
Beyond securing video integrity, we propose that the concept described in this paper is expanded to any 
use case where the integrity and creation time of digitally recorded data must be immediately and  
automatically secured. 
Given this scenario, other trusted timestamping use cases involve: cameras, scanners, environmental 
sensors, self-driving cars, and any data-recording instrument used by industry or in research labs. The 
log files of machines, including their usage statistics, or error messages, could also be automatically 
affixed with a trusted timestamp using blockchain technology. The decentralized trusted timestamping 
of log data could verify the integrity of the log record and thus help companies receive insurance claims, 
or prove that security mechanisms were in place in the case of workplace accidents. 
A military application for automatic decentralized trusted timestamping is the secure documentation of 
weapon activities. The approach could be used to, for example, verify the time of ammunition  
discharge, or to confirm that the required maintenance of a weapon systems has taken place. 
5   Conclusion  
Methods for verifying video file integrity are of crucial importance, especially if video files are to be 
presented as evidence in court. In this paper we proposed the idea and presented an implementation of 
creating trusted timestamps for the video footage of dashboard cameras to prove that the video footage 
was not tampered with after an accident. A fully functional application was developed and released 
under an MIT License. It can be downloaded free of charge here: www.gipp.com/dtt/ 
The presented mobile application continuously records video in the background. If a vehicular collision 
is detected by the phone’s built-in sensors, the application automatically transmits a hash of the relevant 
video files to be stored in Bitcoin’s decentralized and tamperproof transaction ledger, i.e. the blockchain.  
Currently, courts do not routinely accept video footage as evidence, because it is impossible to prove 
that the files were not manipulated after the accident. By using the blockchain of a cryptocurrency to 
store a hash of the video file it can be proven that the footage was not manipulated. Any tampering with 
the file in retrospect would result in a file hash that no longer matches the hash that was embedded in 
the blockchain. 
Beyond the scenario of timestamping video captured by dashboard cameras, the approach of automati-
cally associating timestamps created on the blockchain with digital data has implications for various 
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industrial and military use cases. Among others, use cases for surveillance systems, body cameras, 
drones, log data of machines, and weapon activities were presented. 
 
A decentralized trusted timestamp of this paper has been stored in the Bitcoin blockchain: 
http://www.originstamp.org/u/mTNFhKzKaJ 
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